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Book Reviews
Armed Forces and Society

Women as War Criminals: Gender, Agency, and Justice
By Izabela Steflja and Jessica Trisko Darden
Reviewed by Dr. Heather S. Gregg, professor of military strategy,
US Army War College

H

olding perpetrators of war crimes accountable
became a focus of post-conflict justice in the twentieth
century and has continued to be a critical component
of war termination today. Despite several high-profile
post-conflict tribunals, ranging from the genocide in Rwanda
to the bloody conflict in the former Yugoslavia, few women
have been brought to trial as war criminals—and even fewer
have received sentences equal to their male counterparts.
Women as War Criminals investigates this contrast, seeking
to understand this bias and its underlying conditions and
“provide a more holistic approach to women and justice” (9).

Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2020
180 pages
$14.00

At the heart of their argument, Izabela Steflja and Jessica Darden contend
“women as war criminals go unnoticed because their very existence challenges
our deeply held assumptions about war and about women” (3). They focus on the
social and political contexts that produce gender and racial stereotypes and note
women are often victims of violent conflicts. For this reason, post-conflict justice
has focused on bringing perpetrators of these crimes—most often men—to trial
and overlooked the possible role of women. These stereotypes describe women
as inherently peaceful, nurturing, and motherly and assume women engage in
atrocities either because they are monsters or they have been manipulated by male
leaders, thus denying the women agency in their acts. Steflja and Darden also
highlight the growing body of literature supporting the Women, Peace, and Security
Act of 2017 and its emphasis on women as peacemakers and not perpetrators of
violence—another bias downplaying the role of women as perpetrators of war
atrocities. Ultimately, gender-based stereotypes about women help explain the
paucity of women brought to justice as war criminals.
The authors test their argument through four short cases of women brought
to trial for war crimes across several cultures and conflicts: Biljana Plavšić, the
former president of the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), and her
role in directing mass murder and rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Pauline
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Nyiramasuhuko, former minister for women and family development in
Rwanda, and how she facilitated the rape and murder of women in the Rwandan
genocide; Lynndie England, a former enlisted US Army Reserve soldier, tried
by Army courts-martial for violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
in connection with the torture and prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in
Baghdad, Iraq; and Hoda Muthana, an American-born Yemeni woman who
emigrated to Syria and joined ISIS.
Steflja and Darden examine the women’s court cases, noting where gender
stereotypes were used as a defense. For example, all four women used the defense
of being mothers to challenge their charges, implying the nurturing nature of
mothers could not allow for murder, rape, or torture. Interestingly, Plavšić used
this defense—having no children of her own—as “the Mother of the Serb nation”
in Bosnia to seek a lesser charge and sentence (11).
Critically, each of the defenses centered on the women being manipulated by
men to perpetrate war crimes, including Nyiramasuhuko, who ordered the rape
of fellow women in Rwanda, and England, whose courts-martial focused on
her intellectual challenges and coercion by male soldiers. From these cases, the
authors conclude: “ ‘A man made me do it’ remains a plausible defense” (122). In
other words, these women were presented as lacking agency and were thus not
responsible for their actions. Despite this fact, each of the women defended their
actions outside of court, including in media interviews, memoirs, and biographies.
Notably, Steflja and Darden propose racial bias also played a role in the verdicts
and sentencing of the perpetrators. Nyiramasuhuko, a Black African woman, is
the only woman still in prison. Muthana, an Arab Muslim, remains in Syria for
her ISIS affiliation and has not been granted permission to return to the United
States. By contrast, Plavšić and English, both White Western women, are free;
therefore, the authors surmise “white women can negotiate plea deals, but Africans
certainly cannot, not even the Christian Nyiramasuhuko” (127).
Women as War Criminals concludes “women war criminals are a long-standing
phenomenon” requiring greater attention in post-conflict literature (121). The
implications of the authors’ research are important to understanding the role
women play as active and willing participants in war and holding them accountable
for the atrocities they choose to commit. It points to the need for the Women, Peace,
and Security Act of 2017 to include the role of women not only as peacekeepers,
but as war makers. Finally, the book offers a cautionary note on the use of
gender-based stereotypes in trial defenses: women can and do perpetrate war
crimes and should be held accountable.
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Biography

Agent Sonya: Moscow’s Most Daring Wartime Spy
By Ben Macintyre
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

B

en Macintyre’s Agent Sonya is an insightful and
important biography of Colonel Ursula Kuczynski,
who went by the code name Sonya throughout her long and
eventful career as a spy for the Soviet military intelligence
(GRU). She was born in 1907 into a wealthy German family,
with a father who was sympathetic to communism and
supportive of the Soviet Union. At 17, she described herself
as a member of the German Communist Party and
New York: Crown, 2020
participated in a number of communist events. Macintyre
400 pages
often simply calls her Ursula due to her use of false
$28.00
identities and various surname changes through marriage. He
describes her as a brilliant, ambitious, adventurous, and risk-addicted operative
who was dedicated to her craft as a Soviet intelligence agent.
Ursula’s transformation from a communist activist to a Soviet agent occurred
when she traveled to Shanghai, China, with her first husband. Like most European
expatriates, Ursula lived in the privileged international settlement portion of the
city and had little contact with the Chinese. In her community of expatriates,
she met the “radical American writer, Agnes Smedley,” whose work she greatly
admired (18). Smedley worked with Soviet intelligence and felt Ursula was
worth recruiting as a GRU operative. Moscow agreed, and Smedley set up a
meeting between Ursula and Richard Sorge, the most senior Soviet GRU agent
in Shanghai at that time, who would eventually become one of Stalin’s most
important spies. Ursula agreed to work with Sorge and help the communist
cause in any way she could. This agreement was an important commitment
as the Chinese Public Security Bureau ruthlessly hunted down both Chinese
and foreign communists, and as a German Jew she could expect no help from
Nazi diplomats.
Sorge trained Ursula in the fundamentals of clandestine action and encouraged
her to take advantage of her penchant for languages and study Russian. Later,
she agreed to attend a seven-month intelligence training course in Moscow,
despite having to leave her family. After completing the training, Ursula was sent
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to Japanese-controlled Manchuria to help arm, supply, and finance communist
Chinese resistance forces while evading the ruthless Japanese secret police,
the Kempeitai.
Following her successful work in the Far East, Ursula was sent to Poland,
where she felt her assignment was little more than serving as a “secret postman”
(143). GRU headquarters concurred she was being underused and sent her
to Switzerland to recruit her own team of agents to infiltrate Nazi Germany.
While she did excellent work there, Moscow later ordered her to leave due to
an increased danger of being discovered and even deported to Germany (since
she had entered Switzerland on a German passport). With few other options,
Ursula divorced her husband and married a British communist and member of her
network, Len Beurton. She then left for the United Kingdom, arriving in February
1941 as a legal immigrant and resuming her activities as a GRU agent.
Macintyre notes that unlike Soviet agents, Nazi spies were not active in the
United Kingdom between 1939 and 1945 due to the quick detection of their
radio transmissions by codebreakers at Bletchley Park. Throughout the war, the
Nazi danger remained the central concern for British domestic security force,
MI-5, while Soviet espionage was of only limited interest. These priorities helped
Ursula advance in her work and become the handler for one of the most important
spies in history, the expatriate German physicist and lifelong communist,
Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs appeared to the British to be uninterested in politics,
except for opposing the Nazis, and correspondingly was allowed to begin working
on their nuclear research project in June 1941.
As his research progressed, Fuchs became increasingly unhappy the West
was not sharing its atomic secrets with its Soviet ally. This discontent led
him to contact Soviet intelligence and offer to obtain secret information on
their behalf. Eventually, Fuchs was assigned to Ursula, who supervised his
intelligence-gathering activities. She worked with Fuchs for about a year
until he was assigned new handlers after he was sent to the United States to
participate in the US Manhattan Project. After the war, the British arrested
Fuchs when US codebreakers cracked portions of previously indecipherable
Soviet messages. Ursula was implicated in Fuchs’s espionage but not
conclusively. After several badly bungled MI-5 interrogations and the defection
of one of her agents to British intelligence, Ursula and her children successfully
fled to East Germany, where she was considered a hero. She died there in
July 2000.
Macintyre is a leading contemporary writer on historical intelligence topics,
and this book is one of his best. He interviewed all of Ursula’s living family
members and numerous other people involved in her story. Ursula’s own
writings later in life, which encompassed both fiction and nonfiction, also
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proved useful as did declassified MI-5 files and the surviving publicly
available records of other intelligence services.
Agent Sonya is interesting because of its detailed consideration of the
espionage activities of human spies, although it is clearly outdated on the use of
technology. Ursula’s career also illustrates how small mistakes in the fields
of intelligence, counterintelligence, and general security can lead to serious
consequences. There are numerous lessons in the book about how espionage
and counterespionage activities should be addressed to maximize their
potential for success and how such activities can be bungled.
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Irregular Warfare

Special Operations: Out of the Shadows
Edited by Christopher Marsh, James D. Kiras, and Patricia J. Blocksome
Reviewed by Major Zachary Griffiths, director, Commander’s Action Group,
Special Operations Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve

I

n the last 20 years, US Special Operations Command has
doubled in size and tripled in budget. But has research
into special operations kept pace? Special Operations: Out of
the Shadows introduces academic special operations research
to nonspecialists while delving into the field’s “debates
and cutting edge research” (4). Skillfully assembled by the
editors of Special Operations Journal, this volume includes
updated articles previously published in the journal and newly
written chapters.

Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2020
231 pages

This publication marks an important milestone in special
$85.00
operations studies—publishing an initial volume of works.
Special Operations offers a more generalized and American focus than Special
Operations from a Small State Perspective (2017), which explored Scandinavian
special operations. Other special operations research can be found in PRISM:
A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations—which published Austin Long’s
“The Limits of Special Operations Forces” and “Special Operations Doctrine:
Is It Needed?” by Charles T. Cleveland, James B. Linder, and Ronald Dempsey
in 2016—or focused outlets such as Special Operations Journal.
Special Operations is divided into theoretical and applied sections. The editors
open the theoretical section with a strong chapter on the history of and research
into special operations. Then, James D. Kiras in chapter 2 and Christopher Marsh,
Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn in chapter 3 debate whether special operations
needs a comprehensive theory. In chapter 4, Kevin L. Parker rejects formalizing
a human domain of conflict but calls on other domains to integrate human
factors. Homer W. Harkens in chapter 5 offers information on the evolution of
special warfare as a concept that both novices and experts will find valuable. Dan
Cox’s chapter 6 describes terrorism’s connection with insurgency and concludes
with important recommendations for unconventional warfare practitioners. The
theoretical section concludes with Ben Zweibelson’s call for greater incorporation
of design thinking in special operations in chapters 7 and 8.
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The applied section connects special operations with contemporary security
issues. Richard Rubright, leading with chapter 9, argues the United States
must weigh the costs and benefits of employing proxy forces in pursuit of our
goals because of the challenges in controlling their actions. In chapter 10,
Charles K. Bartles offers a well-grounded view of the debate over the Gerasimov
Doctrine and concludes with a valuable discussion of Russian irregular warfare
organizations. Paul S. Lieber and Peter J. Reiley in chapter 11 provide an
accessible and practical guide to combating ISIS radicalization efforts with
psychological operations grounded in social science. In their respective chapters,
James M. DePolo in chapter 12 and Steven R. Johnson in chapter 13 describe
the evolution of American foreign security cooperation organizations and how
the authorities for military support to countering transnational terrorism have
evolved. The editors conclude by offering direction for special operations research,
with emphasis on understanding contributions to space and cyber operations.
Special Operations offers a rich bibliography—more than 17 pages—
of peer-reviewed articles, history, military journals, military doctrine, and official
government publications which provides fodder for future research in a notoriously
difficult subject to study. Unfortunately, few authors drew on student papers from
the Naval Postgraduate School special operations/irregular warfare curriculum or
the service staff colleges. Despite their mixed quality, many of these papers could
offer important unclassified perspectives into issues facing operational special
operations forces that are ripe for further study.
Unfortunately, as a collective work, Special Operations encourages special
operations forces to do more without acknowledging the opportunity costs. For
example, Zweibelson acknowledges the high costs of leaders investing “their own
valuable time” and a “special operations design education [that] needs to mirror
the long-term operator development glide path” (81, 89). However, he never
supports his assertion that “long term deliverables will undoubtedly return on the
investment in [unrecognizable] ways” (96). With flat and declining budgets, what
areas should be cut to make room for increasing the countering of transnational
crime or increasing design thinking? Special Operations neither articulates targets
for cuts nor makes compelling cases for the new ideas.
The individual chapters vary in quality and scope, a tension exacerbated by
aiming for both novice and expert audiences. Generally, shorter chapters, like those
by Parker on human factors and Harkins on special warfare, were more engaging
and challenging than their longer counterparts. Similarly, Lieber and Riley
structured their psychological operations chapter around utilizing a compelling
method to defeat ISIS radicalization. In a few places, the authors descended
into jargon (see “change poet” on page 85), but terms were generally defined and
acronyms minimized throughout (85).
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Acceptable for novices and experts interested in the field’s debates, Special
Operations will inspire students in developing their research projects and reveal
new perspectives to academics studying irregular warfare and related topics.

Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods
of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias
By Stephen Biddle
Reviewed by Ben Wermeling, defense and operations research analyst

F

or much of the twenty-first century, the American
military has spent considerable effort fighting nonstate
actors such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This effort has sparked
considerable scholarly and military interest in nonstate actors
among the United States and Western countries. Much of
the resulting literature assumes nonstate actors primarily
wage guerilla or irregular warfare. In recent years, though,
some nonstate actors have used methods associated more
Princeton, NJ: Princeton
with conventional warfare. In the Donbas War, for example,
University Press, 2021
Ukrainian separatists fought from entrenched positions
464 pages
$35.00
using heavy weaponry, including tanks and artillery, to
hold ground. Stephen Biddle explores these variances in
military behavior in Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords,
and Militias.
Biddle’s central argument asserts the military methods of nonstate actors can
be predicted by their internal politics and perceived stakes in conflict, as well
as the state of military technology available. Early chapters elaborate on this
theory. First, Biddle describes a spectrum of military behavior based on common
understandings of irregular and conventional warfare and provides a system to
code this behavior by considering factors such as the willingness of combatants to
contest territorial control and their distinguishability from noncombatants.
The sophistication of military technology plays a substantial role in
determining optimal behavior along this spectrum. Increasingly, lethal weapons
provide incentives for both state and nonstate militaries to employ methods closer
to the midspectrum. Such weapons require militaries to operate from concealed
and covered positions in dispersed groups, as opposed to massed formations, to
limit casualties. Demands for greater dispersion make it more challenging for
states to concentrate their usually larger militaries to crush nonstate forces that
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try to contest territory, making relatively conventional methods more viable for
nonstate forces. In particular, Biddle contends the proliferation of precisionguided weapons, like anti-tank missiles, since the late-twentieth century has given
nonstate actors a much better capability to contest territory.
Midspectrum warfighting requires coordination and specialized,
interdependent roles to be effective. Not all nonstate actors will be able to
master complex techniques such as combined arms operations or fire and
movement tactics. Nonstate actors with more mature institutions and high
perceived stakes in conflict are more likely to implement midspectrum
methods and perform them effectively. Mature institutions allow greater trust
and coordination among the elites and their factions within nonstate groups.
Additionally, if elites perceive high stakes in the conflict, such as their possible
death or imprisonment, they are more willing to incur the expensive costs of
training personnel in midspectrum warfare.
The case studies—selected based on their ability to test the theory—are
well chosen: Hezbollah, Jaysh al-Mahdi, the Somali National Alliance, the
Croatian National Guard, the Serbian Army of Krajina, and the Viet Cong.
Biddle’s choices will lead to greater confidence if the theory predicts outcomes
correctly and more accurately than prior theories. Other explanations of nonstate
actors’ military behaviors include whether they come from tribal cultures that
supposedly encourage irregular warfare or the degree of materiel superiority
their state opponents possess. To gather sufficient granular detail to code
military behavior, Biddle conducted interviews with participants in most of the
conflicts analyzed.
The varied case studies offer interesting insights and comparisons while
providing solid evidence for the new theory. Several examples are instructive.
Hezbollah comes from a tribal background and receives Iranian support, much
like Jaysh al-Mahdi did before its disbandment. Despite facing the powerful state
militaries of Israel and the United States, the military methods of the two groups
differed significantly. Hezbollah had mature institutions and perceived high
stakes in the 2006 Lebanon War, which facilitated the organization’s remarkably
conventional methods in battle, unlike Jaysh al-Mahdi.
When the Americans intervened in the Somalian Civil War, the Somali
National Alliance fought more conventionally on the margin despite hailing
from a tribal society and fighting a superpower. American efforts to kill insurgent
leadership drastically raised the stakes of the war compared to the earlier
skirmishes to loot resources.
The Viet Cong, as described in the last case study, was a sophisticated
organization fighting for existential stakes; however, it waged predominantly
guerilla warfare. When the Viet Cong attempted more conventional warfighting
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in the Tet Offensive, American forces inflicted severe losses. The light 1960s-era
weapons (from a time before widespread precision firepower) could not stop
massed state forces from overrunning the Viet Cong’s positions with relative ease.
The book concludes with inferences about future warfare. Given the
proliferation of increasingly lethal weaponry, both state and nonstate actors
still face increasing incentives to converge on midspectrum military methods,
further narrowing differences in behavior. In this probable future environment,
Biddle suggests the US military adopt a lighter, updated variation of its legacy
force structure with more dismounted elements, rather than a more radical
transformation that focuses on very irregular or conventional forces. This structure
would maximize the military’s capability against the modal future opponent while
maintaining the residual ability to fight enemies using methods toward the edges
of the spectrum of military behavior.
Nonstate Warfare is timely since nonstate actors in recent decades have used more
conventional military methods and little research has attempted to explain the
differences in nonstate military behavior. Biddle’s thorough coding methodology
to operationalize military behavior offers a more precise understanding of warfare
than the guerilla/conventional dichotomy, replacing vagueness with conceptual
clarity. His well-researched case studies strongly support his theory. An area
for minor improvement would be a more significant differentiation of assessed
wartime stakes, which would provide a more nuanced analysis. Though beyond the
scope of the book, a theory explaining nonstate warfighting before the twentieth
century would also be valuable.
The book’s main insights, that state and nonstate actors face similar incentives
and that their chosen military methods differ in degrees rather than categories,
have important implications for both military professionals and scholars. Nonstate
Warfare is highly recommended reading for both groups.
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Military History

Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World
By H. R. McMaster
Reviewed by Dr. John C. Binkley, adjunct professor of history,
Loyola University of Chicago

A

fter four tumultuous years of the Trump administration,
the Biden-Harris administration needs to reset
American foreign policy. H. R. McMaster—a retired US
Army lieutenant general and the former national security
advisor to President Donald Trump—addresses this issue in
Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World. He clearly
notes any reset of American foreign policy must focus on a
group of important battleground nations that will decide the
direction of America’s future in the world, as well as the state
of democratic institutions in the United States and the West.

New York: Harper, 2020
560 pages
$35.00

While McMaster may have been tempted to write a tellall book memorializing his experiences in the Trump administration, he rejected
that opportunity to write a primer which outlines the direction of an American
foreign policy reset. In doing so, he focuses on what he considers key battleground
arenas: China, Iran, the Middle East, North Korea, Russia, and South Asia. He
also recognizes collateral arenas such as environmental and climate politics and
the future role of democratic institutions, all issues a Biden-Harris administration
cannot ignore.
McMaster, who received a PhD in history from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, is well known for his seminal study of the Vietnam
War, Dereliction of Duty (1997). Consequently, as a historian and foreign policy
practitioner, he analyzes each battleground and reviews the historical background
of each battleground arena to understand the policy situation as it existed at
the end of the Trump administration. In each case, he finds American foreign
policy over the last several administrations, and in some cases over much longer
periods of time, was fundamentally flawed. While each battleground arena has its
peculiarities based on historical and geographic dynamics, the underlying reasons
for the flawed policies are twofold: a tendency of American policy to be driven by
strategic narcissism and, conversely, an absence of strategic empathy.
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Strategic narcissism is “the tendency to view the world only in relation to the
United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily
on US decisions or plans” (15). Strategic empathy is the ability to appreciate the
desires and goals of other nations and their people and to understand these groups
can affect policy regardless of America’s desires. This two-sided policy failure has
warped America’s ability to understand the dynamics at work in the battleground
nations, placing blinders on American policymakers.
After a historical overview, McMaster discusses how America should deal
with each battleground. While the specific proscriptions offered vary from
battleground to battleground, there are commonalities among them. First, he
suggests American foreign policy needs to be robust and, in fact, very hawkish in
nature. In this regard, he is willing to confront adversaries and friends alike. This
robust almost aggressive policy is particularly clear regarding China, Iran, North
Korea, and Russia. He argues the United States should push back against Russian
aggression in the Ukraine and Russian disinformation worldwide. Similarly, the
United States needs to confront Chinese movements in the South China Sea
and China’s theft of Western intellectual and technological property.
In both cases, McMaster makes a great deal of sense. Moreover, his analysis of
North Korean interests and motivations for developing a nuclear weapon seems to
be spot on. In the case of Iran, he notes the nation must ultimately make a decision:
either receive the benefits of a responsible member of the international community
or exist in isolation. McMaster understands the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action—which the Obama administration hoped would halt Iran’s nuclear
arms program and that the Trump administration scrapped—only addresses a
symptom of the difficult relationship between Iran and the West. Constant pressure
is the only approach that may force Iran to choose the path toward responsibility.
Second, as a student of the Vietnam War, McMaster correctly recognizes
the flaws in that war being repeated in Afghanistan and Iraq. These include
the failure to develop a long-term strategy, which can gain the support of the
American people, and a lack of appreciation for the social aspect of the wars.
Having said that, readers might wonder how McMaster would gain public support
for what appears to be an open-ended conflict.
Third, McMaster seems willing to apply tough love to erstwhile allies such
as Pakistan and the countries of the Middle East. Pakistan’s role as a nuclear
power makes its relationship with America more important than the situation
in Afghanistan.
Though a good read, Battlegrounds has one major flaw—or, in this case, an
omission. While McMaster claims to be absolutely apolitical, which partially
explains his decision to limit writing about the Trump administration, he
actually makes a political choice by virtue of his criticisms of the Obama
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administration and what he considers a new left slant of Democratic foreign
policy. He sees lack of consistency and trust to be two great problems of American
foreign policy. Yet, he seems unwilling to confront the Trump administration
for exacerbating these problems. At the same time, while he wants the United
States to push back against Putin’s aggression, he ignores Trump’s obsequious
approach toward the Russian leader. In short, while he is readily willing to
blame other administrations for their faults, he fails to confront the impact of
Trump’s actions.
While readers can agree or disagree with McMaster’s recipe for America’s
foreign policy success, they cannot ignore the issues he raises. Consequently,
I heartily recommend the book for anyone interested in the future direction of
American foreign policy.

Atomic Salvation: How the A-Bomb Attacks
Saved the Lives of 32 Million People
By Tom Lewis
Reviewed by Michael E. Lynch, research historian,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

I

n Atomic Salvation, Tom Lewis explores the question
of whether or not the use of the atomic bomb in
World War II was necessary to end the war against Japan.
Today this question has taken on a moral and emotional
dimension, as many people conflate the strength of the
two relatively small atomic bombs used on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki with the power of today’s nuclear weapons,
concluding they were overkill and unnecessary. Reality,
Havertown, PA: Casemate,
however, shows conventional fire bombing raids on Tokyo
2020
364
pages
were far more devastating and caused greater casualties
$34.95
than either of the two atomic bombs. While Atomic
Salvation purports to be an “exhaustive analysis” of the
necessity of using the atomic bomb, it presents little new information (7).
Lewis argues the atomic bomb was necessary and its deployment saved
many more lives than it took. Analyzing the potential lives to be saved
based on projected daily casualty figures from the fighting in the Pacific and
using plans for Operation Downfall, the pending invasion of the Japanese
Islands projected to last until the end of 1946, he calculates the potential
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casualties for both the Allied and Japanese people would have totaled more than
32 million people.
Lewis reaches the right conclusion, but he does so by repeating—and in many
cases excessively quoting—experts who have already reached this conclusion.
His extensive reliance on Richard B. Frank’s Downfall: The End of the Imperial
Japanese Empire (1999), John Toland’s The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the
Japanese Empire, 1936–1945 (1970), Edwin P. Hoyt’s Japan’s War: The Great Pacific
Conflict (1986), Stephen Harper’s Miracle of Deliverance: The Case for the Bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1985), and others make it difficult to discern if he has
added any new information. Indeed, the bibliography is almost devoid of primary
sources. Additionally, Lewis uses Gar Alperovitz as a straw man to attack specious
arguments for not using the atomic bomb, which is all too easy to do. On a positive
note, he extensively cites the US Strategic Bombing Survey and correctly identifies
errors within the survey.
The book badly needs additional editing. A good editor could have helped
Lewis avoid careless mistakes such as typos, culturally incorrect spellings, incorrect
rank or position descriptions, purple prose such as “to say that time was of the
essence would be the understatement of the 20th century,” and glitches such as
five separate footnotes in one sentence (199).
In addition, Lewis’s careless writing led him to make some egregious factual
errors. There are many examples, but chapter 18 provides two errors on successive
pages. On page 296 Lewis identifies Charles Sweeney as the pilot of the Enola
Gay (Sweeney flew Bock’s Car over Nagasaki), and on page 297 he features a
globe showing atomic tests around the world. The caption, and Lewis’s apparent
intention, indicates tests in the United States, but the photograph features Asia.
Last, his tendency toward repetition led him to repeat an entire block quote from
chapter 2 in chapter 17.
A work of this kind calls for a certain amount of conjecture about what might
have happened had the invasion taken place, but Lewis’s speculation steered
him to hyperbole. For instance, he alleges the American public would have
been so outraged if the United States had decided not to use the bomb that
“armed insurrection would have been a very real possibility” (250). He also argues
President Harry S. Truman had no choice but to use the bomb because “he
would have been deposed from office by public revolt or military coup, and a more
co-operative leader installed” (250).
While Lewis uses some sources well, he fails to understand the background
of some of the authors. Key examples include Paul Fussell, a US Army
infantry officer, and William Manchester, a US Marine, whose memoirs and
recollections he cites extensively. He treats their first-person accounts respectfully,
but seems not to understand they both survived the war and became widely
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respected historians. Manchester’s experiences as a Marine rifleman are
evocative, but Lewis adds little to what Manchester published himself. One of
Manchester’s best known works is the biography American Caesar: Douglas
MacArthur 1880–1964 (1978), which Lewis could have profitably used to explore
the issues of war termination and the pending invasion from the point of view
of the General of the Army who commanded the Southwest Pacific Theater. In
conclusion, Atomic Salvation would be twice as good if it were half as long—
and if it added new facts to an already well-documented argument.

The American War in Afghanistan: A History
By Carter Malkasian
Reviewed by Dr. John Nagl, visiting professor, national security studies,
US Army War College

F

ew Americans not of Afghan blood understand the
United States’ involvement in Afghanistan better than
Carter Malkasian, who led the Garmser district support
team for nearly two years during the Obama administration.
From that experience, Malkasian wrote War Comes to Garmser
(2013), a small classic of counterinsurgency literature that led
Marine General Joseph Dunford Jr., then commanding the
effort in Afghanistan, to take Malkasian as his political adviser. Malkasian stayed on as the special assistant for strategy
during Dunford’s service as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, continuing to focus on the war in Afghanistan, and has
now written—what is likely to be for many years to come—
the definitive work on the American war in Afghanistan.

New York: Oxford University
Press, 2021
576 pages
$34.95

Malkasian’s analysis begins with America’s significant involvement in
supporting resistance fighters to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
Assisted by the Americans, the Afghan mujahideen demonstrated the fighting
qualities that earned Afghanistan the moniker “the graveyard of empires” and
defeated the Soviet Union. Included among the mujahideen supporters was a
Saudi named Osama bin Laden.
After the Soviet withdrawal, the United States displayed little interest in
Afghanistan for a decade. Afghanistan’s descent into chaos was snapped partially
into order when the Taliban imposed a strict version of sharia law on the
troubled country. The Taliban also provided a home base for bin Laden from
which he planned and executed the attacks of September 11, 2001. They refused
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to hand him over to the United States for justice, resulting in an American
invasion that turned into the country’s longest war—bin Laden’s plan
executed almost to perfection, although he did not live to see its final chapter.
Malkasian explores the war in exacting detail, focusing on south and east
Afghanistan and the two principal antagonists: the Americans and the Taliban.
He covers the initial US invasion, which led to the collapse of the Taliban
regime in December 2001, and the critical failure to engage the Taliban in the
government that emerged afterward, which he calls a “narrow and inflexible
approach [that] contravened diplomatic wisdom to bring adversaries into a . . .
political settlement” (76). It proved the first of many missed opportunities. Bin
Laden slipped across the border into Pakistan, where he would remain in hiding—
but continue to exercise leadership of al-Qaeda—for the next decade.
Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai became the interim—and later the
elected—president of Afghanistan and a small force of approximately 8,000
troops from the United States and 5,000 from allied nations, mostly NATO,
began building a new Afghanistan that would not again serve as a safe haven
for terrorists. American attention turned to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which had
played no role in the attacks of September 11 but nonetheless became the next
target in President George W. Bush’s War on Terrorism. As an insurgency
exploded in Iraq, the Taliban took advantage of the lack of American attention
and gained strength in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama saw no
alternative but to surge tens of thousands of troops to fight against the Taliban
insurgency. However, he announced a withdrawal date that reassured the Taliban
they could wait the Americans out, leading many to remark, “Americans have
the watches, but the Taliban have the time to wait” (various). Vice President
Joseph Biden argued against the surge of troops into Afghanistan, recommending
a smaller US troop commitment to conduct counterterrorism and train Afghan
security forces, but was overruled.
President Donald Trump believed the war in Afghanistan was not in America’s
interest and repeatedly threatened to withdraw all US troops; his commitment
to ending the war led to a negotiated agreement with the Taliban that this
withdrawal would be accomplished by May 1, 2021. By then, however, Biden was
president; he delayed the withdrawal date first to September 11 and then to August
31, 2021, continuing to commit to that date even as a resurgent Taliban seized
power over Kabul on August 15, 2021. A US and international airlift evacuated
Americans and many Afghans who had assisted the United States in its longest
war outside of the country. After an absence of two decades, Taliban rule returned
to Afghanistan.
Malkasian spreads the blame for America’s failures in Afghanistan widely,
noting the Russian, Iranian, and Pakistani support for the Taliban, as well as
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American impatience, wavering commitment, and failure to understand the
Afghan people. Most of all, however, he pays tribute to the Taliban, who “stood for
what it meant to be Afghan” because they “embraced rule by Islam and resistance
to occupation, values that ran thick in Afghan history and defined an Afghan’s
worth” (454). An Afghan government supported by an outside power could not
inspire the same degree of cohesion and devotion fostered by the Taliban.
The final reckoning on this fifth war in Afghanistan remains to be calculated.
Nearly 2,500 US troops were killed and more than 20,000 wounded; while Afghan
casualties are unknowable, the total probably exceeds half a million. Al-Qaeda
was dealt a heavy blow, but the Islamic State took on its mantle of jihad and
remains a strong presence in post–America Afghanistan. An Afghan people who
have experienced democracy and freedom face an uncertain and deeply troubling
future. Their eagerness to leave Afghanistan during the troubled final weeks of
August suggests the suffering of this unfortunate country will continue for
decades to come.
While the American people broadly support the end of the mission in
Afghanistan, if not the manner in which it was conducted, there is still no
guarantee American involvement is truly over, just as there was no guarantee
when the Soviet Union withdrew in ignominy three decades ago. To be ready
for that eventuality—and to build a force that is truly capable across the entire
spectrum of conflict—military professionals can find no better preparation than
a thorough contemplation of Malkasian’s The American War in Afghanistan.
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Strangling the Axis: The Fight for Control of the
Mediterranean during the Second World War
By Richard Hammond
Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, senior research historian,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

I

n Strangling the Axis:The Fight for Control of the Mediterranean
during the Second World War, Richard Hammond takes a
wider view of the war on Axis commercial shipping in the
Mediterranean during the Second World War. He starts
with a very effective introduction, a mere 10 pages, that
outlines the following eight chapters. Chapter 1 summarizes
prewar strategy and plans, while chapters 2 through 8 are
chronological, in increments of five to seven months, starting
in June 1940 and ending in May 1943. The conclusion
integrates the introduction with the narrative chapters.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2020
290 pages
$39.99

The central theme of the book is the lack of a
holistic historical accounting of the effects of the Allied war on Axis
shipping beyond noting impacts on the land war in North Africa (4, 6).
Previous histories have highlighted the impacts of the anti-shipping war
on the North African land war, but inadequately. Hammond concludes
the increasing efficacy of British anti-shipping operations, attacking not
only traditional sea lanes but also coastal shipping, exercised a deadly
impact on Axis maritime strength. What the British lacked in capacity—
described in detail—they compensated for with their de facto forward
positioning for most of the Desert War. Hammond believes the historiography—
with its excessive emphasis on the land motor transport—has failed to acknowledge
this impact (142).
Hammond’s coverage is sweeping and comprehensive. He presents his
evidence by building a solid foundation in the relevant Italian and German
documents, besides the Allied sources and the historiography. His wider
war goes beyond the swirling armor-centric actions in the Western Desert
campaign, and analyzes operations throughout the Mediterranean and Aegean
regions. Each chapter is well organized, integrating maritime operations with
land operations in considerable but concise detail. Hard statistics document
Axis sustainment requirements, shipping losses by cause, and supply tonnages
lost and delivered. Readers can follow developments in the air, on land, and on
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the sea as independent missions became more joint. In a sense, Hammond’s
commitment to a more holistic analysis provides much in terms of the current
joint functions.
His analysis of British efforts includes land-based airpower, naval aviation (both
carrier-borne and shore-based), submarines, and surface warships. Interestingly,
British political and diplomatic concerns on rules of engagement early in the
war limited military options, for example unrestricted maritime warfare, with
some lasting through early 1942 (28–30). Worse, British submarines were
low-end boats technologically, and they had relatively poor-quality torpedoes and
insufficient stocks of the latest designs (46, 71).
Hammond devotes a lot of attention to the fielding of more effective aircraft
types, covering other enablers and joint techniques on the opposing sides.
For example, he discusses the advance of Allied and Axis signals intelligence,
the British introduction of air-to-surface vessel radar, more effective Italian
anti-submarine warfare skills, and British use of operational research, such as
systems analysis. He also showcases the evolution of command-and-control
structures. Unsurprisingly, Malta retains its historical significance.
Sheer attrition cost the Axis not only tons of supplies lost at sea, but also
numerous hulls. These shipping losses themselves became a prohibitive cost.
New Axis construction and even Vichy acquisitions could not replace the
attrition. Hammond states outright Axis shipping losses became precarious
starting in September 1942 and precipitated a broader Mediterranean collapse
around October 1942 (10, 127, 166). By May 1943, the Axis could not conduct a
Tunisian “Dunkirk.” The stubborn Axis defense and successful evacuation of
Sicily clouded their dire strategic situation. Abandonment of Corsica, Sardinia,
and some Aegean possessions presaged a broader Mediterranean collapse due to
their isolation (169–72, 200–3).
Hammond’s articulation commendably avoids hyperbole. He admits when the
anti-shipping war contributed little to the land war. One example is the initial
British offensive against the Italians in North Africa in 1940 and another is the
Allied Operation Husky on Sicily (49–50, 191–92).
This review offers one caveat. While Hammond has balanced his narrative
with the related land operations admirably, he is perhaps too accepting of the
typical criticism of British Army equipment, especially tanks, compared with
their German counterparts in 1941 through early 1942. The first tank battles
in the Western Desert underlined deficient British combined arms, rather than
inferior equipment.
Strangling the Axis raises numerous issues related to security today. The Allied
war on Axis shipping in the Mediterranean took place in three domains across the
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length and breadth of a sea line of communications. Current developments in greatpower rivalry and preparations for large-scale combat operations suggest several
potential variations. Maritime power still moves the bulk of physical goods
among nations. Future conflict in five domains could commence hostilities
well before traditional warfare, for example cyber and space interference with
shipping lanes. If traditional warfare breaks out, what vulnerabilities would
beckon, both along the sea lanes and to anti-access and area-denial actions at
ports of departure and arrival? How should Army multi-domain operations
and Joint all-domain command-and-control concepts evolve and prepare?

Loss and Redemption at St. Vith:
The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge
By Gregory Fontenot
Reviewed by Gregory J. W. Urwin, professor of history, Temple University

E

ver since S. L. A. Marshall published his flawed
1947 bombshell, Men against Fire: The Problem of
Battle Command, historians have debated the effectiveness
of the US Army in the European theater of operations
during World War II. Eminent scholars such as Russell F.
Weigley and Martin van Creveld have credited the ultimate
American victory to greater numbers, superior artillery
and air support, and more abundant resources. Meanwhile
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
a younger generation of historians—including Ohio State
University Press, 2020
290 pages
University alumni Michael D. Doubler, Russell A. Hart,
$39.99
and Peter R. Mansoor—have argued that while the more
seasoned German Landser may have outclassed the
American GIs in their initial encounters, the Americans learned from hard
experience and eventually became a worthy opponent.
A former tank battalion commander and a distinguished veteran of Operation
Desert Storm, Gregory Fontenot analyzes the trials and ultimate triumph of the
7th Armored Division from the perspective of a professional soldier. Loss and
Redemption at St. Vith is a detailed operational history of the US 7th Armored
Division during the Battle of the Bulge(December 16, 1944 to January 25, 1945).
Drawing extensively on Americanand German archival materials, with interviews,
and correspondence conducted with several veterans, Fontenot grounded his
grassroots research on a thorough reading of earlier histories of the Ardennes
Offensive, an approach that armed him with an obvious mastery of the subject.
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Although Fontenot seems to have discovered his passion for
researching military history at the Command and General Staff College at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, his book complements the scholarship of the Ohio
State University scholars and demonstrates the “underappreciated excellence
of the US Army’s average units as compared to the 1944 edition of the German
Army” (286). While apologists for the American soldier often highlight the
performance of the 1st Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, the
4th Armored Division, and other elite formations, Fontenot reminds readers
that “plain old vanilla draftee divisions” like the 7th Armored Division, the
“Lucky Seventh,” bore the brunt of the fighting in the American advance across
northwest Europe (285).
When three German armies containing 28 divisions launched Adolf Hitler’s
Ardennes Offensive nine days before Christmas in 1944, the Lucky Seventh
received orders to proceed to St. Vith. From their position along a strategic
road and railroad junction, on what became the northern flank of the enemy
penetration, the division denied the Germans the use of the road and rail
networks that passed through St. Vith for six crucial days. By midnight on December 18,
the Lucky Seventh linked up with the battered elements of other American divisions
to cover 52 miles of front line. This tenaciously held, horseshoe-shaped line badly upset
German timetables and helped thwart Hitler’s last desperate bid to change the course
of the war.
Like other American armored divisions, the Lucky Seventh was a balanced
combined-arms formation designed for offensive operations based on fire
and movement. It served under the command of Brigadier General Robert
W. Hasbrouck, an officer whose tank corps–cavalry school background
disposed him to execute the Army’s armored doctrine faithfully. During the
struggle for St. Vith, Hasbrouck preferred to conduct an active defense, issuing
his subordinates mission-oriented orders and fighting his units as flexible
task forces. Strong defensive positions, experienced and aggressive leaders,
and a basic adherence to solid doctrine—enhanced by inspired displays of initiative—
enabled the defenders of St. Vith to fend off eight German divisions until severe
attrition and the weight of enemy numbers forced the surviving Americans to retreat
across the Salm River.
In the following weeks, First Army restored the 7th Armored Division to fighting
shape, which allowed the unit to join the counterattack on January 20, 1945. After
three days of fierce fighting, the Americans retook the previously lost ground at
St. Vith and blotted out any shame the division’s personnel felt over abandoning the
town earlier in the campaign.
Fontenot claims the initiative exercised by junior American officers and private
soldiers played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the Battle of the Bugle.
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He repeatedly stresses the importance of leadership in every situation and
emphasizes that a unit’s performance depends on the quality of its officers.
Additionally, he also admits he considers Hasbrouck the book’s central character,
although Hasbrouck shares the stage with other American officers whose
judgment and adaptability contributed to denying St. Vith to the Wehrmacht for
nearly a week.
Loss and Redemption at St. Vith is a significant contribution to World War II
historiography. It provides apologists with an additional case study to plead
their cause and dissects one of the Army’s biggest battles in terms that officers
serving today can readily understand.

Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing
By Anthony R. Wells
Reviewed by Andrew Ziebell, Army Reserve officer

I

n Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing,
Anthony R. Wells attempts to present both a personal
story of a fascinating career and a comprehensive history
of intelligence sharing. Wells, who began his intelligence
analysis career in 1968, shares his deep understanding of
the history of intelligence and the relationship between
the “Five Eyes”: the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Unfortunately, he
loses the thread of his narrative quite often, and either
the personal angle or the historical angle would have been
better discussed alone.

Havertown, PA: Casemate,
2020
256 pages
$34.95

The subtitle of the book refers to the period of time Wells served in—
or on the periphery of—the intelligence community. He emphasizes the Five
Eyes relationship as a truly special one, yet readers will find a wide range of
historical background that falls well outside this scope and adds little to the
narrative. Indeed, his description of his early activities with naval intelligence
and his role in assessing the Soviet submarine threat conjures up images of
Tom Clancy’s The Hunt for Red October (1984).
While Wells’ well-researched historical accounts are drawn from the most
authoritative sources, his logic can be difficult to follow. Many chapters are
repetitive and appear to have been written separately with little consideration
for how they might fit together into a coherent story. In chapter 6, “Intelligence
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Roles, Missions, and Operations, 1990–2018,” Wells strays far afield into the
history of Bletchley Park during World War II. He details the reading of
Soviet messages in the post-war era and the failure to foresee the Chinese
intervention in Korea and the Soviet occupation of Prague in 1968. Within
the same chapter, readers learn about the importance of signals intelligence—
from the Arab-Israeli conflicts to the Falklands crisis to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. Overall, Wells delivers little information on intelligence roles,
missions, and operations between 1990–2018 and frustratingly less background
on his contributions.
Despite the book’s title, Wells often refers to Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand only in passing or as an afterthought rather than providing concrete
examples of their contributions to the Five Eyes. This oversight may be a
product of his perspective from the positions he held in the United States and
the United Kingdom rather than an intentional slight, but it does disservice to
their significant involvement.
Perhaps the greatest shortfall of the book is the lack of coverage given to
two of the most significant events of the early-twenty-first century. The shortest
chapter of the book, “September 11, 2001 and Its Aftermath,” spends little time
reflecting upon the intelligence failures that led to 9/11. Wells also sidesteps
the recent debate about the decision by the UK government to accept the US
assessment of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction program and
his alleged support of terrorist networks, and he mentions the Chilcot Report
only once. This omission is unfortunate as the 2016 report—published after a
seven-year inquiry—condemned the British intelligence community for not
challenging the US findings. Given the space devoted to so many topics far
outside the purported scope of the book, this omission is an odd choice.
Despite these criticisms, Wells excels in synthesizing his knowledge and
experience to assess current trends and offer predictions about the future.
Between Five Eyes—in particular the final two chapters on emerging threats
and the Five Eyes community in the twenty-first century—is a useful primer
on the future of intelligence and the challenges the community faces. This is,
after all, the purpose of intelligence gathering and analysis: to confirm what
is known, fill in what is unknown, and posit possible outcomes. While Wells
provides readers with much information, he unfortunately leaves them with
more questions than answers.
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Strategy

How ISIS Fights: Military Tactics in
Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt
By Omar Ashour
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, director of research and analysis,
C/O Futures, LLC

O

mar Ashour—an associate professor of security and
military studies in the Doha Institute for Graduate
Studies in Qatar and director of the Strategic Studies Unit in
the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies—has written
a superb and pithy book on Islamic State (IS, ISIS) warfighting
approaches and the organization’s various iterations in Egypt,
Iraq, Libya, and Syria.
Ashour first reviews the current literature on the Islamic
Edinburgh, SCT: Edinburgh
University Press, 2021
State, focusing on explanations—including variables such
256 pages
as population, local support, and geography—related to
$120.00
“how and why weaker armed nonstate actors (ANSAs)
beat or survive stronger armed state actors (ASAs)” (4). He then develops his
central research emphasis and seeks to answer: “How did IS fight and why
did it militarily endure and expand in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt?” (15–16).
How ISIS Fights is divided into a foreword, acknowledgments,
table and abbreviations listings, six chapters, a bibliography, and an
index. The foreword—written by Larry P. Goodson, a professor at the
US Army War College—highlights the groundbreaking findings and
the extensive nature of the fieldwork, interviews, and review of primary
sources (ISIS publications and videos) underpinning the research project.
The chapters, whose titles betray the tactical subtleties of these specific
operational environments, consist of: 1) an introduction which sets out the
project methodology and parameters; 2) the Islamic State fighting style
in Iraq (Fallujah, Mosul, and Ramadi); 3) the Islamic State fighting style
in Syria (Raqqa Governorate); 4) the Islamic State fighting style in Libya
(Derna and Sirte); 5) the Islamic State fighting style in Egypt (actually
the Sinai); and 6) a conclusion regarding ISIS after territorial defeats and
research findings.
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The case studies follow a logical and consistent format: context, battlefront(s)
focus, offensive and defensive descriptions, battlefront(s) analysis, tactics/
innovations, and post-territorial operational environment futures. The notes
are extensive and in English, although at times the original Arabic language
sourcing is apparent. Ashour clearly understands the tactical and operational
nuances of each case study and provides supporting tables to organize the
material. Infantry weaponry and suicide-operations—especially vehicle-borne
improvised explosive devices, given the ISIS deficiency in artillery—play
heavily in the various tactical approaches, as does the increasing use of
weaponized commercial drones. Ashour also discusses ISIS’s ability to shift
rapidly between terrorist, insurgent, and conventional tactics and specific
battlefront variations.
The only real criticism of the book is its highly analytical and dense
writing—readers will need multiple reviews of the material to absorb
its complexity. This complexity, however, is why the research effort is so
highly valued for post-graduate study. A few new acronyms appear in the
work: “iALLTR - Intelligence; absorb/recruit; loot; lead; transfer” and
“SCCLC - Soften-creep; coalition-build; liquidate-consolidate (modus
operandi)” along with a number of improvised explosive device variations
such as “HBIEDs – house-borne improvised explosive devices” (vii, viii).
Further, readers should remember Jihadi/Salafi terminology is crucially
peppered throughout the book and should be embraced as a component of the
ISIS reality construct to understand better the opposing force mindset.
Ashour’s research findings focus on understanding ISIS combat
performance, utilizing “the four variables of combat effectiveness, military
effectiveness, expansion, and endurance” as a conceptual lens (197).
This focus highlights ISIS attributes such as fighter-types, unit-cohesion,
autonomization, combat-multiculturalism, iALLTR, and SCCLC. A
categorization of tactics highlighted in table 6.1 identifies the 16 types
identified (206). While the micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors analysis is a
bit complex, it pans out with the insights gained.
Of the many research findings provided, this one ultimately stands out: “The
organisation rapidly adapted to changing environments and situations” (209).
ISIS exhibits a strategic and operational flexibility setting it apart from
other ANSAs. Ashour indicates the organizational decision-making
process of ISIS—its feedback loop (akin to a tactical level observe, orient,
decide, act loop)—allowed constant exploitation of the rapidly shifting
battlefront environments where its forces were deployed. The stronger
ASAs kept reacting to ISIS adaptations, and thus, constantly lost the
operational initiative.
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How ISIS Fights is a no-nonsense, compact book that effectively
bridges the scholar-practitioner divide in defense and security studies by
filling a critical gap in ISIS threat characterization—a global insurgent entity
still very active throughout the Middle East, Africa, and other geographic
regions. Students at the US Army Command and General Staff College,
the US Army War College officer educational levels, and scholars and
professionals deeply focused on counter-ISIS research and operations
will find it useful. While great-power conflict has rapidly become the
new raison d’être of US national military strategy, and rightly so, the
ISIS hydra—while pretty much dismembered—still has some bite left in it.

Mars Adapting: Military Change during War
By Frank G. Hoffman
Reviewed by Colonel J. P. Clark, PhD, strategist, US Army

I

n Mars Adapting, Frank G. Hoffman—a research fellow at
the National Defense University—turns his attention to
the question of military adaptation in war. Hoffman was a
contributing author to the 2006 Army-Marine Corps Field
Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (2006), coined the
term hybrid warfare, and served as a lead author for the 2018
National Defense Strategy (2018). Though there has been an
increase in attention paid to military change, Hoffman is again
blazing a path many others will soon follow. Mars Adapting
deserves close scrutiny, and readers will be amply rewarded
for doing so.

Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2021
368 pages
$39.95

Hoffman’s title indicates his principal focus: changes made in response to the
surprises of war. Within that context, he considers everything from small local
adjustments to significant institution-wide shifts. He examines organizational
dynamics similarly. Mars Adapting explicitly seeks to fill the gap in bottom-up
studies in the literature, but does not exclude the top-down. Some of the most
interesting passages examine the complex interactions between local adaptations
and those made from on high.
To illustrate the processes of military adaptation, Hoffman employs four
case studies drawn from the modern US military experience: submarines in
World War II, air power in the Korean War, the Army in Vietnam, and the
Marine Corps in Iraq. Inevitably, every author employing case studies faces
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difficult choices in establishing the boundaries from which the cases will be drawn
and then in determining whether to examine more cases for diversity or fewer
cases for greater depth and nuance. In both respects, Hoffman chose well.
Hoffman limits the case studies to the last century of US military experience.
While this decision will undoubtedly draw criticism as too narrow a selection
upon which to provide a universal guide to military adaptation, this pragmatic
choice is beneficial for intended readers. All the case studies occurred within
an organizational context similar enough to today’s environment to be readily
applicable. Cases from militaries with markedly different structures, practices,
or cultures—or from the more distant US past when the organizational context
was quite different—would have diminished the book’s value. For instance, it
would be anachronistic to fault the Civil War–era Army for not having an official
center for lessons learned, but neither would a detailed accounting of the best
practices of the Army of the Potomac be of direct value.
The use of fewer case studies to allow for a deeper examination sets Mars
Adapting apart from similar books offering more but disappointingly cursory
cases. Hoffman’s chapter-length case studies, grounded in a mixture of
secondary sources and archival research, are the right vehicle to grapple with
the complexities of adaptation. Rather than simplistic good or bad examples of
adaptation, each case study presents a mixture of results so readers gain a greater
appreciation for the interlocking challenges of adaptation. For instance, in
the chapter on the Army in Vietnam, Hoffman shows there was an evolution
in tactics. That adaptation, however, occurred within a rigid conceptual
framework set by Generals William Westmoreland and William DePuy,
which locked the units of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, into
seeking ways to fight attritional battles more effectively on the enemy’s
terms. It was adaptation but not of the type that led down a productive
strategic path. One critical insight from these cases is that adaptation takes
time. Even the most successful instances required 18 to 24 months for
full institutionalization.
Hoffman also presents a theoretical framework for military adaptation.
Well versed in the relevant literature across multiple disciplines, he offers
an excellent summation of the field in the first two chapters. The academic
study of military change has been largely dominated by international relations
theorists, most notably Barry Posen and Stephen Peter Rosen, and Hoffman
gives that school of thought due attention. In developing his theory, he
draws more heavily on the scholarship of military historians Theo Farrell and
Williamson Murray and the field of organizational learning theory.
Mars Adapting makes two important theoretical contributions. The first
contribution is a model for adaptation that accounts for both top-down and
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bottom-up change in a process of inquire, interpret, investigate, integrate, and
institutionalize. The second contribution is a list of attributes that define
any organization’s capacity to adapt: leadership, organizational culture, learning
mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms.
Hoffman’s model and attributes will contribute to academic inquiries and help
practitioners think systematically and rigorously about military adaptation. Both
communities will benefit from the case studies, and the nuanced examples within
the case studies will stimulate further thought. Perhaps inevitably, the model
and attributes seem more descriptive than prescriptive. They provide a useful
taxonomy for analysis but do not fully capture why certain leaders or
organizations have the creative spark of successful adaptation while others fall
short. This is consistent with one of Hoffman’s major findings: adaptation is a
difficult and complex process.
Hoffman fittingly concludes with a set of questions for further exploration,
situating the book at the start of a long conversation rather than at its end.
Mars Adapting is required reading for all scholars and practitioners interested
in the questions it raises.

Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy:
The Use of Force Short of War
Edited by Melanie W. Sisson, James A. Siebens, and Barry M. Blechman
Reviewed by Steven Metz, professor of national security and strategy,
US Army War College

C

oercion is an important component of American
statecraft and strategy—vital enough it is taught
in the core course at the US Army War College. It first
became the subject of rigorous social science analysis in
Thomas C. Schelling’s 1966 Arms and Influence. The central
idea of coercion is adroit threats can, under certain
conditions, allow states to attain strategic objectives without
war. The key is to clarify expectations of the adversary and
London: Routledge, 2020
make them believe there will be painful consequences
250 pages
if they do not comply. Like deterrence, coercion requires
$160.00
capability, communication, and credibility. But, where
deterrence is designed to forestall a potential adversary’s action, coercion is
active and immediate and is intended to make an adversary stop or change its
current actions.
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In 1978, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan expanded Schelling’s
initial concept, publishing a series of case studies assessing when coercion
works or does not work. Today’s renewed great power competition increases
the potential risks and costs of a major war—protracted conflict is always
more likely among equal adversaries—and thus makes effective coercion
even more important. For this reason, the editors and contributing authors of
Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy have updated Blechman and Kaplan’s
efforts with recent case studies.
Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy has two purposes: “to provide
information about the conditions under which particular types, sizes, and
uses of the US military increased or decreased the likelihood of coercive
success during the period 1991–2018” and “to determine how uses of
the US military were, or were not, integrated with other tools of foreign
policy in ways that enhanced or degraded US credibility” (10). As with its
predecessors, Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy aims to harness social
science and history to shape security policy, rather than solely to advance
knowledge. The book is more a work of praxis than theory.
The first three chapters lay out the theoretical framework and are
followed by five case studies covering Syria, Iraq and Iran, the Balkans,
Russia, and China—all written by renowned experts. The conclusions are
unsurprising to anyone who has thought seriously about the use of force
in statecraft. For instance, what is threatened “can be determinative”;
the clarity and specificity of threats and demands affect the outcome;
deploying forces into a region from outside it often augments the
credibility of a threat; and last, sanctions and military coercion do not
“partner well,” since sanctions indicate a willingness to rely on methods of
compliance other than force (164–65). For coercion to work, an adversary
must feel certain military force will be used if they fail to comply. The
intricate psychology of coercion creates challenges for the United States.
As the editors of the book explain:
. . . messages are filtered through the target actor’s strategic culture,
domestic political culture, and by the temperament, experiences,
and predispositions of its leadership. Messages thus inherently are
vulnerable to misinterpretation, an eventuality made more likely
by the inconsistencies in the statements made by policymakers,
particularly when allies are involved, and by a lack of specificity in
the nature of threats and demands levied (168).

Put differently, effective coercion requires clarity and consistency—two things
US policy often lacks. The book argues coercion will be more important but
also more difficult for the United States in an era of great-power competition.

Book Reviews: Strategy 147

The period covered in the book, 1991–2018, was one of clear US primacy.
The failure of coercion—or its clumsy application—was not disastrous as the
power disparity between the United States and its adversary amplified the
credibility of threats. But with greater parity between the United States and
its potential adversaries, particularly China, there will be less room for error
and stricter requirements for a threat to be credible. Thus, the book’s editors
conclude, “pursuit of US interest in the coming decades . . . will require a
discipline in the planning and in the implementation of coercive strategy
that the relatively permissive environment of the last 30 years most often
did not” (176).
While the book’s contributors are all top-tier security experts, some
chapters are better than others. Despite this discrepancy, the editors and
authors succeeded in updating the original work of Schelling, Blechman,
and Kaplan and provide an updated framework for analysis to inform policy
in an increasingly dangerous time. Every senior military leader, foreign
policymaker, and strategist should read this book.
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War at the Speed of Light: Directed-Energy Weapons
and the Future of Twenty-First-Century Warfare
By Louis A. Del Monte
Reviewed by Jeffrey Caton, president, Kepler Strategies LLC
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ouis A. Del Monte’s War at the Speed of Light:
Directed-Energy Weapons and the Future of TwentyFirst-Century Warfare is a difficult book to categorize. Akin
to the allure of a richly illustrated sideshow tent, the book’s
glossy cover and dire warnings of future disasters may entice
prospective readers. But when the veil is drawn, the interior
reveals contents incongruent with expectations. Del Monte
claims over 30 years of experience with technology, and
his recent books include Genius Weapons (2018) and
Nanoweapons (2017), as well as a book on time travel.
Curiously, a search of scholarly and professional publication
databases reveals few earlier works.
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In the introduction, Del Monte vows to describe “the ever-increasing and
revolutionary role of directed-energy weapons in warfare” (1). He posits that
“the nature of warfare is changing in three fundamental ways”: through artificial
intelligence, directed-energy weapons, and reliance on electromagnetic energy. He
promises that “this book delineates the threat that directed-energy weapons pose
to disrupting the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD)” (1). Del Monte
touches on aspects of these topics, but never delves into a critical dialogue for any
of them.
Del Monte divides the book into four major sections. The first section, “The
Game of Cat and Mouse,” has three chapters designed to provide historical
context. The contents are a hodgepodge of Cold War issues and warfare
technology culminating in a review of the Third Offset Strategy (popularized by
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in 2014), as well as Del Monte’s construct of
a “Fourth Offset” based on alliances, technology, and the threats of Russia and
China (47). In sum, the chapter is an unnecessary prelude that forewarns readers
of Del Monte’s op-ed approach to the book: personal opinions supported by a
medley of facts that favor his narrative. Neither the exercise of critical thinking
nor the addition of opposing dialogue are luxuries the author abides.
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The second section, “Directed-Energy Weapons,” serves as the
85-page heart of the book, organized into four chapters on laser,
microwave, electromagnetic pulse, and cyberspace weapons. The discussion
on lasers is superficial and highlights only a few US systems currently under
development. Absent is any mention of the successful missile engagements
by the Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne Laser Test Bed in 2010.
In fact, the entire Missile Defense Agency merits only a single sentence
in the book. Instead, Del Monte rehashes a few Soviet-era laser devices
(for example, the Sary Shagan facility) covered in better detail in the 1986
DoD publication Soviet Military Power.
The credibility of Del Monte’s arguments is often questionable. He
summarily dismisses the technological advances of President Ronald Reagan’s
Strategic Defense Initiative as irrelevant for directed-energy discussions.
Also, Del Monte oversimplifies many complex matters into a fait accompli.
For example, his reasoning why the United States should fear an EMP
attack by rogue nations is the assertion: “President Richard Nixon conducted
foreign policy by attempting to convince enemy leaders he was irrational and
volatile . . . Nixon was acting. North Korea and Iran are not” (127). Simply
put, there is too much tangential conjecture and too little thoughtful analysis.
With regard to cyberspace weapons, Del Monte harangues about Russian
interference in US elections and offers a confusing perspective on electronic
warfare. His only cyberspace-specific issue is a recap of the 2010 Stuxnet as
“the first-ever cyber weapon” (135). Yet, in 2008, Operation Buckshot Yankee
transformed how the Department of Defense defends in cyberspace. Also,
the 2007 Russian cyberspace attacks on Estonia helped lay the foundation
for NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Del Monte
mentions neither.
The book’s third section, “Shields Up, Mr. Sulu,” is a thankfully short (23
pages) digression on directed-energy countermeasures and force fields that
adds little to the book except more references to Star Trek. Del Monte offers
only “bug bounties” as cyberspace countermeasures and an anemic four pages
to present Army, Navy, and Air Force electronic warfare countermeasures
(158). He also offers a lesson in plasma physics and a generic discussion of a
Boeing patent for a plasma force-field concept.
The final section, “The Coming New Reality,” covers autonomous warfare,
space warfare, and MAD. Within a jumbled three chapters, Del Monte
doubles down on his rejection of particle-beam weapons as directed energy.
While this is certainly convenient, he fails to recognize the Department of
Defense and the rest of the world do consider particle-beam weapons as
directed energy. In fact, strategic defense initiative programs successfully
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demonstrated particle-beam technologies for directed-energy application
in 1989. Del Monte also seems unaware that US space defenses routinely
trained for the threat of Soviet anti-satellite weapons as well as high-altitude
nuclear detonation and electronic attacks in the 1980s and 1990s.
Del Monte’s final chapter, “Not Gambling with the Fate of Humanity,”
showcases his alarmist nature and shallow knowledge of national
security doctrine. He undercuts his discussion of MAD by contorting its
underlying premise to be “a belief that small nuclear states, having fewer
nuclear weapons, can deter aggression by large nuclear nations” (214).
The culminating revelations are Del Monte’s whimsical guidelines to
“eliminate nuclear weapons . . . use autonomous weapons only under human
supervision . . . [and] arm autonomous weapons only with conventional
warheads” (221).
War at the Speed of Light makes no serious contribution to the fields of the
technical, military, and national security arts and sciences. Simply put, this is a
book to avoid in lieu of much better subject material freely available to the public.
To be fair, Del Monte has admirers. Indeed, his chapter endnotes appear to be
extensive and are a redeeming quality of the tome. Unfortunately, the bounty
of information contained in the credible sources is rarely shared with readers.
While there is little doubt Del Monte would be a competent high-school
physics teacher, the book clearly demonstrates that authoritative discussions of
future warfare technology and national security are best left to others.

